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STUDENT COMMENTS
EFFECT OF EXCULPATORY LANGUAGE ON ILLEGAL
UNION SECURITY PROVISIONS
An action' brought by the trustees of the United Mine Workers
of America Welfare and Retirement Fund seeking a judgment from
defendant corporation for $84,176.40 was based on an industry wide
collective bargaining agreement called the National Bituminous Coal
Wage Agreement, which contained a provision requiring that Quality
Coal Corp., one of the employers, pay forty cents to the Fund for
every ton of coal produced during a two year period. The employer
based its defense primarily on the contention that the entire agreement
was invalid because of the inclusion of the provision that
(1
. . . as a condition of employment all employees shall be or
become, members of the United Mine Workers of America,
to the extent and in the manner permitted by law . . ."
[Italics supplied.]
The employer contended that this language provides for a closed
shop, thus violating Sec. 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act. 2 Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. That of the
plaintiffs was granted. On appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding
that the union security provision was so qualified by its terms, ex-
pressed in one complete sentence, that it was not violative of Sec.
8(a) (3), thus distinguishing prior cases in which attempts were made
to exculpate illegal provisions by general savings clauses.
The problem which faced the court is one which has been produc-
tive of much litigation in the federal courts since the enactment of
the National Labor Relations Act. Many collective agreements con-
taining union security provisions of questionable validity have con-
tained also exculpatory clauses seeking to limit their operation within
limits permissible under the NLRA. The crucial questions on which
the validity of any such agreement must turn are (1) whether the
union security provision by its nature tends to coerce employees in
the direction of union membership, and (2) if there is such coercive
Lewis v. Quality Coal Corp., 270 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1959).
2 "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . .. .
"(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organiza-
tion: Provided, That nothing in this sub-chapter, ... shall preclude an employer from
making an agreement with a labor organization ... to require as a condition of employ-
ment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such
employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is later . . ."
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tendency, whether the agreement can be saved by resorting to the
formalities of contract law and taking technical refuge in an excul-
patory clause.
The oft cited Red Star Express Line case,' decided by the Second
Circuit in 1952, involved a petition by the National Labor Relations
Board for enforcement of its order directing employer to desist from
giving effect to a union security provision in the collective bargaining
agreement which required employees to maintain their membership
in the union as a condition of employment. The union security
article provided that the employer would hire only union men if
available, but otherwise could employ non-union help on condition
that they become union members within 24 hours after employment.
During negotiations leading to a renewal of the agreement, the
parties, being uncertain as to the legality of some provisions of the
original contract, agreed by letter upon an addendum to the contract
providing that any clauses illegal under the National Labor Relations
Act should be considered null and void. It was urged in the litigation
that the addendum was sufficient to suspend the operation of the
concededly illegal union security provision. The court denied this
contention, holding that the execution of the contract, by reason of
the inclusion of a forbidden union security provision, constituted an
unfair labor practice. "This is so," the court said, "because the exist-
ence of such an agreement without more tends to encourage member-
ship in a labor organization. The individual employee is forced to
risk discharge if he defies the contract by refusing to become a member
of the union." The court went on to say that the modification of the
contract did not purge it of its infirmity, for the question is not whether
under principles of contract law the addendum would negative the
union security provision, but whether it would have the effect of
preventing coercive interference with the employees' right to abstain
from union membership. The court adopted the finding of the NLRB
that the addendum would not eliminate the coercive tendency of the
union security provision "because it fails to specify which, if any,
clauses were to be suspended." Judge A. Hand stated that because
of the vagueness of the language the ordinary employee would be
unable to understand that the union security provision was no longer
binding, for the parties themselves were unable to determine which
parts of the contract were affected.
In the same year the Second Circuit handed down the Gaynor
News decision,4 an action brought by the NLRB to cease enforcement
3 Red Star Express Line of Auburn v. NLRB, 196 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1952).
4 NLRB v. Gaynor News Co., 197 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1952), aff'd 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
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of a collective bargaining agreement which included a union security
provision executed without benefit of a Board-conducted union shop
election. Under the Iaw in force at that time no such clause could
legally be executed unless the majority of the employees in a Board-
conducted election authorized it. Since no election had been held,
the provision was illegal. The contract did, however, contain a
"savings clause" providing that "should . . . any provision of this
agreement be in conflict with [the NLRAI, then such provision shall
continue in effect only to the extent permitted." The court concluded
that the clause did not defer the application of the union security
provision, but only postponed the issue of its legality for future
determination, emphasizing that only a specific clause deferring ap-
plication of the union security provision would immunize the contract
against the illegality. The court stressed the fact that an employee
cannot be expected to predict the validity or invalidity of particular
provisions in the contract, and thus would feel compelled to join
the union where a union security provision of questionable validity
existed.
In 1954 the same court in NLRB v. Gottfried Baking Co.,'
directed enforcement of a Board order instructing the employer
to cease giving effect to a collective bargaining agreement containing
a provision that the employer would hire only union members, that
the union would have the right to supply replacements, and if unable
to do so, the employer could hire anyone he wished, provided the
new hire be required to become a union member within 30 days.
In an attempt to salvage as much union security as possible should
the preferential hiring device be declared illegal, the union had secured
inclusion in the contract of a clause, entirely separate from the
preferential hiring provision, stating that
"If . . . the closed shop is in conflict with the law, then the
union shop shall prevail . . . . together with such additional
provisions for union security as shall be legally permissible,
it being the intention of the parties to grant the maximum
union security permitted by law."
The court held the preferential hiring provision illegal, citing
the Red Star case for the proposition that such an agreement by
its very terms tends to encourage union membership. Nor, said the
court, was the provision purged of its inherently coercive tendency
by the vague and separate "savings clause."
The common rationale of the three cases is that a union security
210 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1954).
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provision illegal per se because written so as to exclude non-union
applicants at the threshold cannot be purged of its illegality by a
general savings clause which fails to eliminate the tendency of the
union security provision to encourage union membership. Whether
the savings clause exculpates the union security provision of its
unlawful character as a matter of contract law is not determinative
of the question whether the clause prevents an 8(a) (3) violation that
would otherwise occur. An illegal union security provision, apart
from the practices occurring under it, inherently tends to encourage
union membership. The coercive effect on an employee issues directly
from the nature of an illegal union security provision, and the tendency
to coerce union membership is not checked by mere contract for-
malities. The coercive tendency is nullified only if the employee is
clearly apprised of the fact that no form of union membership not
sanctioned by law will be required of him. A savings clause which
fails clearly to specify which provisions of the agreement it affects
is not sufficient to so apprise prospective employees. A vague,
general, and independent savings clause will not help the ordinary
employee to understand that the union security provision is not
literally binding according to its terms, for the employee will be
unable to predict the validity of a provision to which he cannot be
sure the savings clause is meant to apply. He will still feel compelled
to join the union where a questionable provision exists. Only a savings
clause specifically deferring application of the union security provision
until the issue of its legality is determined would clearly inform an
employee that the provision is not presently binding, and thus nullify
its natural coercive effect.
The same collective agreement which gave rise to the Quality
litigation came before the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee in 1958 in Lewis v. Fentress Coal & Coke Co.° That
case arose in the same manner as the Quality case, the plaintiffs suing
for a money judgment under the trust fund agreement. After holding
that it was the intent of the parties that the union security provision
should not be operative in a state having a right to work law, 7
 such
as Tennessee, the court answered the contentions put forth by
the employer by holding that the union security provision was not
violative of Sec. 8(a) (3) of the NLRA. The court characterized the
exculpatory language° (identical to that considered by the Seventh
6
 160 F. Supp. 221 (M.D. Tenn. 1958) aff'd 264 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1959).
7 9 Tenn. Code Anno.	 50-209, 50-210.
8 "It is further agreed that as a condition of employment all employees shall be or
become, members of the United Mine Workers of America, to the extent and in the
manner permitted by law . ..."
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Circuit in the Quality case) as a savings clause and held that it
was sufficiently clear and unequivocal to absolve the union security
provision of illegality. Judge Miller in his opinion distinguished the
Red Star, Gaynor, and Gottfried cases on the basis that the clauses
in those cases were vague and uncertain and were not savings clauses
in the real sense of the term, but attempts to effect the deletion
from the agreement of any provision which might later be held invalid.
In the Quality case the Seventh Circuit reached the same result
as did the Tennessee District Court in the Fentress case, but placed
a different label on the exculpatory language of the National Bitumi-
nous Coal Wage Agreement. In writing the Fentress opinion Judge
Miller considered the issue as being the same one involved in the
Red Star, Gaynor, and Gottfried cases, continually referring to
the exculpatory language as a savings clause. He was content to
rest the decision on the ground that the clause was "clear and un-
equivocal" enough to excise the infirmity from an otherwise illegal
union security provision. Judge Castle in the Quality opinion en-
visaged the situation as being essentially different from that involved
in the three earlier cases. Each of the collective agreements previously
considered by the Second Circuit contained a union security provision
which concededly would have been illegal standing alone. The only
possibility of preserving its legality was by resort to an independent
savings clause which the parties had included in the contract. Judge
Castle, in the Quality opinion, emphatically disagreed with the Fen-
tress approach of characterizing the exculpatory language as a savings
clause and of circumscribing the scope of its reasoning by the con-
cepts and language employed in the Red Star, Gaynor, and Gottfried
cases. He rested the Quality decision on the holding that the union
security provision was so limited and qualified by its own terms
that it was not violative of 8(a) (3). The qualifying phrase "to the
extent and in the manner permitted by law" was considered to be
an integral part of the union security provision. It was noted by
the court that "[t]he language employed is not couched in the form
usually employed in a so-called 'savings clause.' It is language which
serves to restrict and modify the words of the same sentence in which
it is employed and relates to that subject matter alone. Here the
meaning and intent of the contractual provision involved is fully ex-
pressed in one sentence. No general requirement is imposed, limita-
tions on which must be searched for in some other separate . . .
clause of the contract." The court stressed the idea that the validity
of the union security provision is assured "by the very language in
which the condition of union membership is stated," that this is not
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a case of a provision illegal by its terms which must be sustained,
if at all, by resort to an independent general savings clause. It is, says
the court, rather a case where the provision is qualified by its own
terms so that it meets in itself the test of legality. The majority
opinion in the Quality case thus reinforces the stamp of validity
placed upon the coal industry's collective bargaining agreement by
the Fentress decision, and more clearly delineates the distinction
between that agreement and those involved in the Red Star, Gaynor,
and Gottfried cases.
The dissent in the Quality case urged that the agreement was
unlawful under the NLRA as not being consonant with the prohibition
of 8(a)(3) against a closed shop contract. The dissent characterized
the exculpatory language as a savings clause and relied in part on
the tools of thought fashioned by the Second Circuit in the Red Star
and related cases. In commenting on the provision "that as a con-
dition of employment all employees shall be . . . members of the
United Mine Workers of America, to the extent and in the manner
permitted by law . . . ." the dissent asserts that "[c] ertainly the
language of [Sec. 8a(3)] . . . does not 'permit' a closed shop to any
extent or in any manner . . ." and hence there is an inherent contra-
diction, within the single sentence which so influenced the reasoning
of the majority, between its principal clause and the phrase which
purports to qualify it. This intrinsic ambiguity, under the well estab-
lished principles of contract law,9 allows the court to ascertain the
meaning of the provision by looking to the actual conduct of the
parties under it. Since the case directly involves the illegality of the
agreement and not the practices occurring thereunder, this "a pos-
teriori" reasoning is utilized only to comprehend the construction
placed upon the ambiguous language by the parties themselves. By
the strict maintenance of a closed shop" the parties have realisti-
cally interpreted the ambiguous terms as allowing that degree of
union security, federal law to the contrary notwithstanding. Where
a federal law and a private contract conflict, the latter must fall. In
this instance the agreement becomes wholly unenforceable because
it contains a provision to the effect that all parts are dependent upon
each other." The dissent went on to reinforce its position by applying
here the "a priori" argument of the Second Circuit cases that such a
9 3 Corbin, Contracts § 558 (1957).
to An employee when hired had to join the union by the morning of the third
day or get fired, and, if a non-union employee refused to join, then the union employees
would refuse to work on instructions from the union.
11 "Integrated Instrument—This agreement is an integrated instrument and its
respective provisions are interdependent . . . ."
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provision has an inherently coercive tendency to encourage union
membership, and considered the "savings clause" as too vague to
purge the provision of illegality notwithstanding the fact that they
were integrated within the same sentence.
The precise distinction between the formalistic reasoning of the
majority and the pragmatic argument of the dissent in Quality is
apparent from their respective approaches to the union security pro-
vision with its qualifying phrase. The majority states that the one
complete sentence by its very language is clear and unequivocal; the
dissent, both in its deductive and its inductive rationale, asserts that
the sentence is intrinsically ambiguous and vague. The dissenting
judge is not content to be influenced by semantics alone, but views
the words with their phenomenalistic trappings.
On November 25, 1959, three months after the Quality case
was decided, the U.S. Court of Appeals (D.C. Cir.) handed down the
decision in Honolulu Star-Bulletin v. NLRB," reversing a Board
decision which had held that the collective agreement involved con-
stituted a closed shop contract. The general laws of the International
Typographical Union contained a closed shop requirement in conflict
with Sec. 8(a) (3) and also with Sec. 2(a) 13 of the collective contract.
The agreement, in Sec. 24(c), incorporated by reference the general
laws of the International Typographical Union "not in conflict with
federal and territorial (state) kw or this contract . . . ." [Italics
supplied.]
The Board contended that this was an illegal closed shop contract,
theorizing that employees would have the impression that the union
laws were incorporated in their entirety and would not differentiate
those contrary to federal law or to contract Sec. 2(a). The court,
however, held Sec. 24(c) clear and unequivocal and stated that an
erroneous impression of clear contract terms does not change their
meaning. The Red Star and related cases were distinguished on the
basis that the Star Bulletin contract contained no explicit illegal union
security provision, and Sec. 24(c) did not suspend the operation of
any illegal provision, but rather incorporated certain general laws. A
factual difference certainly exists. While the former decisions rested
on an attempted exculpation of subsisting contract terms, the qualify-
ing language in the Star-Bulletin contract ("not in conflict with fed-
eral . . . law or this contract") is used for the purpose of culling out
12 45 L.R.R.M. 2184 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
13 "The words 'employee' or 'employees' when used in this agreement apply to
journeymen and apprentices. The term 'journeymen' and 'apprentices' shall in no way
be understood to apply exclusively to members of the International Typographical
Union."
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portions of an external document incorporated by Sec. 24(c). Despite
this factual difference, the basic issue is similar. The employee is still
faced with the task of determining whether general language of a
qualifying nature applies to a specific union security provision and of
risking discharge on a faulty determination.
However, while in the prior cases, including Quality, it was neces-
sary for the employee to search out applicable federal legislation in
order to grasp the real significance of the contract's union security
requirements, in this case a perusal simply of Sec. 2(a) of the agree-
ment, to which the qualifying language of Sec. 24 has directed him,
will apprise the employee of the fact that union membership is not a
prerequisite to employment. This essential difference precludes classi-
fication of this case as authority either contrary to the Red Star rule
or reinforcing the Quality holding. A further distinction between the
Star-Bulletin and Quality contracts lies in the contrast between the
clarity innate in the former's qualifying language and the controverted
ambiguity in that of the latter.
The Quality case does not appear to encroach substantially upon
the well-settled rule of the Red Star and related cases that a union
security provision having an innate tendency to coerce union member-
ship cannot be saved by taking technical refuge in the principles of
contract law under the guise of general exculpatory language. The
Quality case is distinguishable on its facts in that the union security
provision and the qualifying language are embodied in one integrated
clause. Furthermore, while the Red Star, Gaynor, and Gottfried cases
were commenced by the NLRB by way of unfair labor practice
charges arising out of allegedly illegal union security provisions, the
Quality litigation was instigated by trustees" of the union trust fund
to recover a money judgment for sums owed under the collective
agreement. The obvious justice of the union's claim to this amount,
coupled with the interdependence of all contract provisions, so that
the striking down of one would abrogate the whole, militated against
a defense based solely on the alleged infirmity of a single clause
topically unrelated to the one sued upon. These considerations pre-
clude the effective use of the Quality case to erode the bedrock of the
Red Star rule.
EDWARD F. HARRINGTON
HENRY M. KELLEHER
14 The following language in the opinion indicates that the court, in reaching its
result, was influenced by trust considerations: ". . . a trust was created, the corpus of
which was any money transferred or delivered by Quality to the trustees for the pur-
poses of the agreement or which Quality became obligated to transfer to the trustees
for that purpose. We hold that a trust was created." Supra note 1, 142.
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